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PREFAcE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24 was 
established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating 
strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international 
financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within 
the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries. 
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial 
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce 
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional 
reform. 
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers 
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of 
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) 
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. 
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Abstract
Do nations have the policy space to deploy capital controls in order to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises? This paper examines the extent to which measures to mitigate this crisis and 
prevent future crises are permissible under a variety of bilateral, regional and multilateral 
trade and investment agreements. It is found that the United States trade and investment 
agreements, and to a lesser extent the WTO, leave little room to manoeuvre when it comes 
to capital controls. This is the case despite the increasing economic evidence showing that 
certain capital controls can be useful in preventing or mitigating financial crises. It also 
stands in contrast with investment rules under the IMF, OECD and the treaties of most 
capital exporting nations which allow for at least the temporary use of capital controls 
as a safeguard measure. Drawing on the comparative analysis conducted in the paper, 
the author offers a range of policies that could be deployed to make the United States 
investment rules more consistent with the rules of its peers and the economic realities of 
the 21st century.ix Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements
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I.  Introduction
At least since the Great Depression, and very 
much so in the run-up to and in the wake of the current 
financial crisis, some nations have relied on capital 
controls as one of many possible tools to mitigate or 
prevent the financial instability that can come with 
short-term inflows and outflows of capital. In the 
bubble years before the current crisis became acute, 
nations such as China, Colombia, India and Thailand 
regulated inflows of capital in order to stem those 
bubbles. When the crisis hit, nations like Iceland, 
Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Argentina and 
Ukraine put capital controls on outflows of capital 
to “stop the bleeding” related to the crisis (IMF, 
2009). 
As will be shown in this paper, the economic 
evidence is fairly strong about the use of capital 
controls, especially when used on a temporary basis. 
However, there is concern that the myriad trade and 
investment treaties across the world may prohibit 
the use of measures to prevent and mitigate financial 
bubbles and subsequent crises. There are a number 
of works that examine the policy space for industrial 
development, but very few that examine policy space 
for measures pertaining to financial stability (Kolo, 
2009; Shadlen, 2005; Gallagher, 2005; Anderson, 
2009b; Mayer, 2009). This paper conducts a com-
parative analysis to pinpoint the extent to which 
nations have the policy space for capital controls in 
the world economy.
The major findings of this research are exhib-
ited in table 1. In table 1, policy space under the 
WTO, the United States bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs), and other 
BITs and FTAs by other capital exporting countries 
is presented. Under no regime are capital controls 
permitted for current transactions unless sanctioned 
by the IMF. For the capital account however, there 
is interesting variation. 
The WTO allows for nations to deploy capital 
controls on both inflows and outflows as long as 
nations have not committed to the liberalization of 
certain financial services. If a nation has made com-
mitments in financial services, restrictions on inflows 
are not permitted. However, it will be shown that 
there are safeguard measures that may apply. In terms 
of recourse, if a nation that has liberalized financial 
services does restrict capital inflows or outflows that 2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 58
nation could be subject to a dispute panel that could 
rule that the nation deploying the measure could be 
retaliated against.
The United States BITs and FTAs do not permit 
restrictions on inflows or outflows. If a nation does 
restrict either type of capital flow they can be subject 
to investor-state arbitration whereby the government 
of the host state would pay for the “damages” accrued 
to the foreign investor. The BITs and FTAs of other 
major capital exporters such as those negotiated by 
the European Union (EU), Japan, China and Canada, 
either completely “carve out” host country legisla-
tion on capital controls (therefore permitting them) 
or allow for a temporary safeguard on inflows and 
outflows to prevent or mitigate a financial crisis. The 
United States does not have either measure. However, 
a handful of FTAs have recently allowed for a grace 
period whereby foreign investors are not allowed to 
file claims against a host state until after the crisis 
period has subsided. 
Following this brief introduction, the paper is 
divided into four additional parts. The second part 
provides a brief overview of the economic theory, 
policy and evidence regarding capital controls. The 
third part examines policy space for capital controls 
under the WTO. Part four provides a comparative 
analysis that juxtaposes the United States treaties 
alongside the WTO and the regional and bilateral 
treaties of other major capital exporting countries. 
Part five summarizes the key findings and offers 
policy recommendations. 
II.  capital account liberalization and 
capital controls: theory and evidence
Advocates for capital market liberalization 
argue that, by liberalizing the flows of international 
capital, developing countries would benefit by get-
ting access to cheaper credit and investment from 
developed markets, promoting growth and stability. 
Indeed, conventional theory implies that investment 
tends to flow to developing countries, where the 
marginal returns may be higher (Barro, 1997). That 
view, based on the assumption of perfect capital 
markets, has been largely discredited with the recent 
experiences of currency crises (Ocampo, Spiegel and 
Stiglitz, 2008). International capital flows tend to be 
Table 1
POlIcy SPAcE FOR cAPITAl cONTROlS: A cOMPARISON
WTO United States BITs/FTAs Other BITs/FTAs
Permissible capital controls
Current capital No No No
Inflows Noa No Sometimes
Outflows Noa No No
Safeguard provisions
Current capital Yesb No Yesb
Inflows No No Yes
Outflows Yes No Yes
Number of countries covered 69 58
Dispute resolution format State-to-State Investor-State Investor-State
Enforcement instrument Retaliation Investor compensation Investor compensation
a  Capital controls fully permissible for nations that have not committed to liberalize cross-border trade in financial services.
b  Permitted only under IMF approval.3 Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements
pro-cyclical, creating excess inflows during booms 
and causing capital flight in moments of instability, 
further aggravating crises. 
Moreover, it has been shown that capital market 
liberalization in developing countries is not associ-
ated with economic growth (Prasad et al., 2003). 
Indeed, the most recent research has shown that 
capital market liberalization is only associated with 
growth in nations that have reached a certain insti-
tutional threshold – a threshold that most developing 
nations are yet to achieve (Kose, Prasad and Taylor, 
2009). This is partly due to the fact that the binding 
constraint for some developing country growth tra-
jectories is not the need for external investment, but 
the lack of investment demand. This constraint can 
be accentuated through foreign capital flows because 
such flows appreciate the real exchange rate, thus 
reducing the competitiveness of goods and reduc-
ing private sector willingness to invest (Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2009).
Capital controls have been found to stabilize 
short-term volatile capital flows; and can give policy-
makers additional policy instruments that allow them 
more effective and less costly macroeconomic stabi-
lization measures; can promote growth and increase 
economic efficiency by reducing the volatility of 
financing and of real macroeconomic performance; 
and can discourage long-term capital outflows (Ostry 
et al., 2010). The literature on capital controls gener-
ally discusses at least six (somewhat overlapping) 
core reasons why nations may want to deploy them 
(Magud and Reinhart, 2006). These can be referred 
to as “the six fears” of capital flows:
  1.  Fear of appreciation: capital inflows cause 
upward pressure on the value of the domestic 
currency, making domestic producers less 
competitive in the international market, hurting 
exports and therefore the economy.
  2.  Fear of “hot money”: the large injection of 
money into a small economy may cause dis-
tortions and eventually a sudden reversion if 
foreign investors try to leave simultaneously. 
	 3.	 Fear	of	large	inflows: large volumes of capital 
inflows, even if not all hot money, can cause 
dislocations in the financial system.
  4.  Fear of loss of monetary autonomy: a trinity is 
always at work: it is not possible to have a fixed 
(or highly managed) exchange rate, monetary 
policy autonomy and open capital markets. 
Specifically, when central banks intervene in 
the exchange market buying foreign currency in 
order to curb the appreciation of the exchange 
rate, they effectively increase the domestic 
monetary base. Trying to raise interest rates to 
offset that effect causes more capital inflows, 
as foreign investors rush in to take advantage 
of higher yields. 
  5.  Fear of Asset Bubbles, raised by Ocampo and 
Palma (2008): This is a particularly important 
issue in the 2008 financial crisis, since the burst-
ing of the real state bubble was the root cause 
of the banking crisis around the globe. 
	 6.	 Fear	of	capital	“flight”: capital may rapidly 
leave a nation in the event of a crisis or because 
of contagion (Grabel, 2003; Epstein, 2005). 
Table 2 exhibits a sample of various types of 
capital controls that have been deployed by nations 
to address these fears. 
Table 2
cAPITAl cONTROlS AND cAPITAl 
MANAGEMENT TEchNIqUES
Inflows
•  Restrictions on currency mismatchesa
•  End use limitationsb
•  Unremunerated reserve requirementsc
•  Taxes on inflows
•  Minimum stay requirements
•  Limits on domestic firms and residents from 
borrowing in foreign currencies
•  Mandatory approvals for capital transactions
•  Prohibitions on inflows
Outflows
•  Limits on ability of foreigners to borrow domestically
•  Exchange controls
•  Taxes / restrictions on outflows
•  Mandatory approvals for capital transactions
•  Prohibitions on outflows
Source:  Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones, 2007; and Epstein, 
Grabel and Jomo, 2008. 
a  Borrowing abroad only allowed for investment and 
foreign trade.
b  Only companies with foreign currency reserves can 
borrow abroad.
c  Per cent of short-term inflows kept in deposit in local 
currency for specified time.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 58
Economists usually differentiate between capital 
controls on capital inflows and controls on outflows. 
Moreover, measures are usually categorized as being 
“price-based” or “quantity-based” controls. Table 2 
lists examples of controls on inflows and outflows, 
though sometimes the distinction can be murky (Ep-
stein, Grabel and Jomo, 2008; Ocampo, Kregel and 
Griffith-Jones, 2007). Examples of quantity-based 
controls are restrictions on currency mismatches and 
minimum stay requirements and end-use limitations. 
Many of these have been used by nations such as 
China and India. Examples of price-based controls 
include taxes on inflows (Brazil) or on outflows (Ma-
laysia). Unremunerated reserve requirements (URR) 
are both. On one hand they are price-based restric-
tions on inflows, but they also include a minimum 
stay requirement which can act like a quantity-based 
restriction on outflows. 
Controls are most often targeting foreign-
currency and local currency debt of a short term 
nature. Foreign direct investment (except for FDI in 
the financial sector) is often considered less volatile 
and worrisome from standpoint of macroeconomic 
stability. Inflow restrictions on currency debt can 
reduce the overall level of such borrowing and steer 
investment toward longer-term productive invest-
ments and thus reduce risk. Taxes on such investment 
cut the price differential between short and long term 
debt and thus discourage investment in shorter term 
obligations. Outflows restrictions and measures are 
usually deployed to “stop the bleeding” and keep 
capital from leaving the host nation too rapidly.
According to the IMF, between 2004 and 2009, 
46 nations deployed capital controls 117 times. These 
figures should be seen as underestimates, because 
Central Banks voluntary report such information to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which until 
recently did not see capital controls as favourable 
actions. Examples include URRs by Colombia and 
Thailand, taxes on inflows by Brazil, taxes on all 
financial transactions by Bolivia and quantitative 
restrictions on inflows and outflows by China (IMF, 
2009).
The literature on the effectiveness of capital 
controls is too vast to cover here. However, two 
comprehensive assessments of the literature have re-
cently been conducted. In sum, the literature strongly 
supports the use of capital controls on inflows. Evi-
dence on outflows is more controversial. Magud and 
Reinhart (2006) conduct the most assessment of the 
literature to 2006. In their analysis, they express con-
cern over the lack of a unified theoretical framework 
to analyze the macroeconomic consequences of the 
controls, the heterogeneity of countries and control 
measures, the multiplicity of policy goals and what 
constitutes “success”. As most studies investigate a 
few country cases (mainly Chile and Malaysia), it is 
difficult to make generalized conclusions from the 
literature in the field. Theirs is the most valiant at-
tempt to overcome these shortcomings. What’s more, 
the authors also “weight” the findings in the literature 
with respect to their econometric rigor. 
To summarize, say Magud and Reinhart (2006), 
“in sum, capital controls on inflows seem to make 
monetary policy more independent, alter the compo-
sition of capital flows and reduce real exchange rate 
pressures”. In terms of outflows, it is clear that such 
provisions were successful in Malaysia, but it is not 
so clear about the case of other nations (table 3).
In a February 2010 Staff Position Note (2010), 
the IMF staff reviewed all the evidence on capital 
controls on inflows, pre and post crisis and concluded: 
“capital controls – in addition to both prudential 
and macroeconomic policy – is justified as part of 
the policy toolkit to manage inflows. Such controls, 
moreover, can retain potency even if investors devise 
strategies to bypass them, provided such strategies 
are more costly than the expected return from the 
transaction: the cost of circumvention strategies 
acts as “sand in the wheels” (IMF, 2010). To come 
to this conclusion, this recent and landmark IMF 
study reviews the experiences of post-Asian crisis 
capital controls. The IMF also conducted its own 
cross-country analysis in this study, which also 
has profound findings. The econometric analysis 
conducted by the IMF examined how countries that 
used capital controls fared versus countries that did 
not use them in the run-up to the current crisis. They 
found that countries with controls fared better: “the 
use of capital controls was associated with avoiding 
some of the worst growth outcomes associated with 
financial fragility” (IMF, 2010: 19).
There has even been some attention by promi-
nent economists on the need for restrictions on 
outflows. Calvo (2009) argues that capital controls 
could be deployed to dampen the impact of capital 
flight during crises. Even in “normal” times however, 
Calvo argues that prudential regulations should some-
times be coupled with foreign exchange restrictions 
to reduce capital flight. 5 Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements
To summarize, there is an emerging consensus 
in the economics profession regarding capital con-
trols. Capital controls, especially those on inflows, 
are increasingly seen as a prudential measure for 
developing countries hoping to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises.
III. Policy space for capital controls at 
the WTO
This section of the paper examines the extent 
to which the WTO, grants nations the policy space 
to deploy capital controls. The key of WTO law that 
covers capital flows is the General Agreement of 
Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS is currently 
the only binding multilateral pact that disciplines 
capital controls, though specific countries may have 
certain freedoms if the governments in place in the 
1990s did not make widespread commitments in the 
financial services sector. More specifically:
A member is most protected from a WTO chal- • 
lenge over capital controls if it committed no 
financial services sectors to GATS coverage in 
any mode. 
However, even nations that have made wide- • 
spread commitments in financial services may 
have – if challenged – recourse to various excep-
tions, although these have not been tested and 
the record of WTO exceptions in other contexts 
is not reassuring.
The policy space for controls on  •  current account 
transactions defers to the IMF. 
A.  The General Agreement on Trade in Services
The GATS is part of the Marrakesh Treaty that 
serves as an umbrella for the various agreements 
reached at the end of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
negotiations that established the WTO. The GATS 
provides a general framework disciplining policies 
“affecting trade in services” and establishes a com-
mitment for periodic future negotiations. The GATS 
is divided on the one hand into a part on “General 
Table 3
lITERATURE ON ThE EFFEcTIvENESS OF cAPITAl cONTROlS












Brazil   Unclear Yes No Unclear
Chile   Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Colombia (1993)  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Colombia (2007) No Yes
Czech Republic   No Yes
Malaysia (1989)   Yes Yes
Malaysia (1994)   Yes Yes Yes Yes
Thailand  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Croatia Yes
Controls	on	outflows	 
 Malaysia (1998)   Unclear Yes
 Spain   Unclear Unclear Unclear
 Thailand  Yes Yes Yes
Multi-country studies   Yes Yes Yes No
Source:  Magub and Reinhart, 2006; and IMF, 2010.6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 58
Obligations”, which binds all members. These include 
the obligation to provide most favoured nation treat-
ment to all WTO members (Article II), and some 
disciplines on non-discriminatory domestic regulations 
that are still being fully developed (Article VI).
On the other hand, the GATS also includes a part 
dealing with “Specific Commitments”, which apply 
only to the extent that countries choose to adopt them 
by listing them in their country specific schedules. 
These cover primarily the disciplines of Market Ac-
cess (Article XVI) and National Treatment (Article 
XVII) (Raghavan, 2009). 
Numerous annexes cover rules for specific 
sectors: the Annexes on Financial Services are of 
particular relevance for capital controls. However, 
trade in services occurs across the four services 
modes discussed in the GATS in general:
    Mode 1: cross-border supply is defined to 
cover services flows from the territory of one 
Member into the territory of another Member 
(e.g. banking or architectural services transmit-
ted via telecommunications or mail);
    Mode 2: consumption abroad happens when 
the consumer travels outside of the country to 
access a service such as tourism, education, 
health care and so forth;
    Mode 3: commercial presence occurs when 
the user of a financial service is immobile 
and the provider is mobile, implying that the 
financial service supplier of one WTO Mem-
ber establishes a territorial presence, possibly 
through ownership or lease, in another Mem-
ber’s territory to provide a financial service 
(e.g. subsidiaries of foreign banks in a domestic 
territory); and
    Mode 4: Presence of natural persons are when 
financial services are supplied by individuals of 
one country in the territory of another. 
IMF analysts have found that about 16 countries 
have significant Mode 1 commitments in financial 
services, while around 50 each have significant Mode 2 
and 3 commitments for the sector – this includes most 
OECD countries (Valckx, 2002; Kireyev, 2002). 
Generally speaking, GATS negotiations and 
commitments are of a “positive list” approach, 
whereby nations only commit to bind specified sec-
tors to GATS disciplines. This stands in contrast with 
a “negative list approach”, which is more common 
for goods negotiations and in most FTAs. In a nega-
tive list or “top down” approach, negotiators assume 
that all sectors will be covered in some way, except a 
handful that are listed by particular nations. 
WTO members have recourse to binding dispute 
settlement procedures, where perceived violations of 
GATS commitments can be challenged and retaliatory 
sanctions or payments authorized as compensation.
B.  Capital account liberalization, capital 
controls and GATS
Unbeknownst to many, GATS commitments re-
quire the simultaneous opening of the capital account. 
Those nations that make commitments under Modes 
1 and 3 for financial services are required to permit 
capital to flow freely to the extent that such capital 
is an integral part of the service provided – though 
some exceptions may apply. GATS Article XVI on 
Market Access contains a footnote (8) that references 
capital liberalization: 
If a Member undertakes a market-access com-
mitment in relation to the supply of a service 
through the mode of supply referred to in 
subparagraph 2(a) of Article I [i.e. Mode 1] 
and if the cross-border movement of capital 
is an essential part of the service itself, that 
Member is thereby committed to allow such 
movement of capital. If a Member undertakes 
a market-access commitment in relation to the 
supply of a service through the mode of supply 
referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of Article I 
[i.e. Mode 3], it is thereby committed to allow 
related transfers of capital into its territory. 
[italics added]
While Modes 1 and 3 are explicitly referred to 
here, Article XI(2) also refers to capital liberalization:
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the 
rights and obligations of the members of the 
International Monetary Fund under the Articles 
of Agreement of the Fund, including the use 
of exchange actions which are in conformity 
with the Articles of Agreement, provided that 
a Member shall not impose restrictions on 
any capital transactions inconsistently with its 
specific commitments regarding such transac-
tions, except under Article XII or at the request 
of the Fund. [italics added]7 Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements
Taken together, these provisions indicate that a 
country that makes GATS financial service commit-
ments in the modes of cross-border trade (Mode 1) 
and establishment of commercial presence (Mode 3) 
may explicitly be required to open its capital account. 
In such instances, the nation’s ability to deploy capital 
controls related to capital inflows would be restricted. 
The text is silent on whether capital controls related 
to capital outflows are similarly disciplined.
As an aside, capital account transactions are not 
restricted under the IMF Articles Agreement, and thus 
nations are free to choose whether capital controls 
are part of their arsenal to prevent and mitigate finan-
cial crises. However, a distinction needs to be made 
with respect to financial services and capital flows. 
Under the GATS, nations liberalize specific types of 
financial services, such as banking, securities, insur-
ance and so forth – which does not necessarily imply 
capital movements or changes in fundamental capital 
account regulation. 
However, there are scenarios where the liber-
alization of financial services will require an open 
capital account. The IMF cites the following Mode 1 
example, where “a loan extended by a domestic 
bank to a foreign customer using internationally 
raised capital creates international capital flows and 
international trade in financial services. To the ex-
tent that a financial services transaction involved 
an international capital transaction, the capital 
account needs to be opened for the former to take 
place freely” (Kireyev, 2002). Another paper by an 
IMF official provides examples of how the GATS 
Mode 1 essentially requires the liberalization of a 
capital account:
... to the extent that a member restricts its 
residents from borrowing from non-residents, a 
member’s commitment to allow banks of other 
members to provide cross-border lending serv-
ices to its nationals would require a relaxation 
of this restriction. Similarly, if a member also 
makes a commitment to permit non-resident 
banks to provide cross-border deposit services, 
such a commitment would require the member 
to liberalize restrictions it may have imposed 
on the ability of residents to hold accounts 
abroad. In these respects, the GATS serves 
to liberalize the making of both inward and 
outward investments (Hagan, 2000).
This is echoed in a recent book by Sydney Key 
(2003) who says “The bottom line is that if a country 
makes a commitment to liberalize trade with respect 
to a particular financial service in the GATS, it is 
also making a commitment to liberalize most capital 
movements associated with the trade liberalization 
commitment. The WTO, in a recent paper (2010), 
quoted from Key’s work to make the same point. 
In other words, liberalizing cross-border trade in 
financial services (Mode 1) may need an open capital 
account to facilitate such trade that of course results 
in international capital flows. A similar scenario 
can be outlined in terms of Mode 3 liberalization. 
A loan extended by a foreign bank to a domestic 
client requiring capital to be transferred from the 
parent company of the foreign bank to its subsidiary 
abroad would also require an open capital account. 
In any event, it is worth noting that WTO panels are 
not bound to the IMF’s distinction between service 
transactions and capital flows.
If a nation has not listed cross border trade in 
financial services (Mode 1) or commercial pres-
ence of foreign services (Mode 3), that country 
may be free to deploy capital controls as they see 
fit. Indeed, numerous developing nations have not 
“listed” the liberalization of cross-border trade in 
financial services nor Mode 3 commitments under 
the GATS. According to the WTO, the majority of 
developing countries made relatively less commit-
ments in financial services related to capital markets 
(WTO, 2010).
It is also possible that certain types of measures 
may be more GATS compliant than others. Article 
XVI, paragraph 2 is seen as a non-exhaustive list of 
the types of financial services whereby a host nation 
“shall not maintain” restrictions on the flow of capital. 
The list of measures does not explicitly mention any 
of the capital controls and other capital management 
techniques found in table 2. Therefore, a case could 
be made that capital controls of the kind discussed in 
table 2 are not even covered by the GATS.
If a nation’s capital controls were found in viola-
tion of its GATS commitments, it could invoke one 
or more exceptions in the GATS text. A first option 
would be to claim that the measure was taken for 
prudential reasons under Article 2(a) of the Annex 
on Financial Services. This exception reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the 
Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented 
from taking measures for prudential reasons, 
including for the protection of investors, de-
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fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service 
supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability 
of the financial system. Where such measures 
do not conform with the provisions of the 
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means 
of avoiding the Member’s commitments or 
obligations under the Agreement.
Inflows controls such as unremunerated reserve 
requirements or inflows taxes could be argued to be of 
a prudential nature, especially given the new IMF re-
port discussed earlier. However, the sentence stating 
that prudential measures “shall not be used as a means 
of avoiding the Member’s commitments or obliga-
tions under the Agreement” is regarded by some as 
self-cancelling and thus of limited utility (Tucker and 
Wallach, 2009; Raghavan, 2009). Others however do 
not see the measure to be second-guessing but rather 
“as a means of catching hidden opportunistic and 
protectionist measures masquerading as prudential” 
(Van Aaken and Kurtz, 2009). Still others point out 
that, in contrast with other parts of the GATS that 
require a host nation to defend the “necessity” of the 
measure, there is no necessity test for the prudential 
exception in the GATS. This arguably gives nations 
more room to deploy controls. Indeed, Argentina lost 
cases related to controls under BITs because they 
failed such a “necessity test”(Burke-White, 2008). 
Nations have requested that the WTO elaborate on 
what is and is not covered in the prudential exception, 
but such requests have fallen on deaf ears (Cornford, 
2004). And as of this writing, the prudential exception 
has not been tested. 
If a country’s capital controls were found in 
violation of its GATS commitments in financial 
services, it could also invoke Article XII “Restric-
tions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments” (BOP). 
Paragraph 1 of Article XII states:
In the event of serious balance-of-payments 
and external financial difficulties or threat 
thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain 
restrictions on trade in services on which it 
has undertaken specific commitments, includ-
ing on payments or transfers for transactions 
related to such commitments. It is recognized 
that particular pressures on the balance of pay-
ments of a Member in the process of economic 
development or economic transition may ne-
cessitate the use of restrictions to ensure, inter 
alia, the maintenance of a level of financial 
reserves adequate for the implementation of 
its programme of economic development or 
economic transition.
The next paragraph specifies that such measures 
can be deployed as long as they do not discriminate 
among other WTO members, are consistent with the 
IMF Articles (thus pertain only to capital account 
controls), “avoid unnecessary damage” to other mem-
bers, do “not exceed those necessary” to deal with 
the balance-of-payments problem, and are temporary 
and phased out progressively. 
It may be extremely difficult for a capital 
control to meet all of these conditions, especially 
the hurdles dealing with the notion of “necessity”, 
a slippery concept in trade law that countries have 
had difficulty proving. Moreover, concern has been 
expressed about the extent to which the balance-of-
payments exception provides nations with the policy 
place for restrictions on capital inflows that are more 
preventative in nature and may occur before “seri-
ous” balance-of-payments difficulties exist (Hagan, 
2000). If a nation does choose to use this derogation, 
the nation is required to notify the WTO’s Balance-
of-Payments Committee (described below).
Table 4 lists the 37 economies that have com-
mitted to scheduling the liberalization of some 
combination of Modes 1, 2 and 3 under the GATS 
(Valckx, 2002). They would be the most prone to 
Table 4
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being disciplined under GATS. Finally, there is not 
a reassuring record of countries being able to invoke 
exceptions at the WTO.
C.  Capital controls and current transactions
Capital controls on the inflows or outflows of 
dividends, interest payments and the like are current 
account restrictions. Remember that, as a rule, the 
IMF Articles of Agreement do not permit current 
account restrictions. However, the IMF may recom-
mend diversion from those rules during a crisis and/or 
under an IMF financial programme. In these circum-
stances, Article XI, paragraph 2 of the GATS applies. 
This article states that the IMF has jurisdiction over 
these types of circumstances and the GATS does not 
apply. Therefore, when a country is permitted by the 
IMF as part of an IMF financial programme to pursue 
capital controls on current transactions, as has been 
the case with Iceland in 2008–09, then the WTO has 
no jurisdiction over the use of controls. 
When a nation seeks to pursue capital controls 
related to the current account and such actions are 
not part of an IMF Financial programme, the nation 
has the potential to do so but has to submit a request 
to the WTO’s Balance-of-Payments Committee. 
D.  The Balance-of-Payments Committee
Any capital control involving capital or cur-
rent account restrictions must be submitted to the 
Committee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, 
which was established for the earlier BOP safeguard 
under GATT and was traditionally responsible for 
consultation dealing with trade restriction for balance-
of-payment purposes. The same body and procedures 
now apply to financial and other services. 
The Committee has never pronounced on any 
current or capital account restrictions related to 
financial services, but the GATS text specifies that 
consultations related to these matters can evaluate 
whether the CMT meets the various criteria outlined 
above, whether “alternative corrective measures … 
may be available” and “in particular” whether the 
measure is progressively phased out. 
This is a unique procedure in the GATS. While 
the WTO compatibility of a country’s domestic policy 
normally is only tested through formal dispute set-
tlement proceedings, CMTs face an additional set of 
hurdles and proceedings under Article XII. 
Returning to some of the key questions outlined 
above, the following can be said about the WTO in 
relation to capital controls. While the WTO’s finan-
cial services provisions remain untested in formal 
dispute settlement, they nonetheless represent the 
world’s only multilateral body with enforcement 
capacity to discipline capital controls, on terms that 
provide less policy space than the IMF Articles of 
Agreement. Capital controls may be disciplined 
under the WTO for approximately 50 of the WTO 
members. If a nation has made commitments in fi-
nancial services, restrictions on Inflows are explicitly 
mentioned in the market access provisions of the 
GATS (though not one capital control is explicitly 
listed in the non-exhaustive list) but outflows may 
also be covered. In terms of compliance, the poten-
tial penalty for non-compliance is sustained cash 
payments or cross-retaliation rights to a large set of 
complaining countries. When nations file claims, the 
dispute resolution process is “state-to-state” rather 
than “investor-state” which will be discussed later 
in the report.
Iv.  capital controls in the United States 
trade and investment treaties
The United States has engaged in investment 
treaty-making since its War of Independence through 
what were called Friendship, Commerce and Navi-
gation treaties. The successors to those agreements 
are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which the 
United States has been negotiating since 1977. The 
United States did not invent BITs; Europeans have 
BITs going back to 1959. Indeed, there are now 
close to 2000 BITs in existence. Beginning with the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994, the United States FTAs also have investment 
provisions analogous to those found in BITs. Finally 
BITs and FTAs also include provisions on financial 
services.
The United States has concluded 46 BITs 
since 1977 and more recently has used very similar 
language to the BITs as part of investment chapters 
in 12 United States Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
(Vandevelde, 2008). This section of the paper reveals 
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deeper and include many more limitations on the abil-
ity of nations to deploy capital controls. Specifically, 
the United States investment rules:
Elevate the rights of the United States capi- • 
tal investors over domestic capital investors, 
whereby the United States investors can file 
claims against violating parties through an 
investor-state dispute settlement process and re-
ceive financial compensation for violations, while 
domestic investors do not have such rights;
Do not permit restrictions on both capital in- • 
flows and outflows;
Provide no clear exceptions for balance-of-pay- • 
ments exceptions, though some FTAs provide a 
grace period for filing investor-state claims.
This section of the paper will have two parts. 
First will be short background on the purpose and 
main provisions of the United States BITs and in-
vestment components of FTAs. Second will be an 
examination of the extent to which nations may 
deploy capital controls under the United States BITs 
and FTAs. 
A.  Investment provisions in the United 
States BITs and FTAs
BITs and investment provisions in the United 
States FTAs have evolved over time to have at least 
five general features. Normally, through an inter-
agency process and with input from outside experts 
and interests, the United States puts together a 
“Model BIT” that serves as the template for negotia-
tions for BITs and FTAs:
The model would be tendered to the other 
party at the beginning of negotiations with 
the hope that agreement would be reached on 
a text that did not differ substantively or even 
in a significant stylistic way from the model. If 
too many departures from the model were de-
manded by the other party, then no BIT would 
be concluded (Vandevelde, 2008: 1).
Scholars have characterized the model BITs and 
subsequent treaties as occurring in three “waves”, 
from 1981 to the early 1989 where 35 BITs were 
negotiated, from the early 1990s to 2002 where the 
NAFTA and a handful of BITs were signed, and 
from 2002 to the present where FTAs with Chile, 
Singapore and Central America were negotiated 
(Vandevelde, 2008). Table 5 lists all United States 
BITs and FTAs with investment provisions based 
on the various models. In 2009 the United States en-
gaged in a review of the 2004 Model BIT that formed 
the core of most United States BITs and investment 
components of FTAs. The new model is scheduled 
for release in mid-2010 and may be used for nego-
tiations of BITs with China, India and Brazil, and in 
FTA negotiations with Pacific nations.
Table 5
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This paper will focus on the treaties completed 
up through the 2004 model BIT, the last being the 
BIT with Rwanda and the FTAs with Peru, Colombia, 
Panama and the Republic of Korea (the latter three 
signed but not ratified at this writing). In terms of 
coverage, whereas the earliest BITs and FTAs focused 
almost solely on foreign direct investment, contem-
porary treaties cover both inflows and outflows of 
virtually all types of investment, including equities, 
securities, loans, derivatives, sovereign debt and 
the financial services facilitators of such flows. Ac-
cording to Vandevelde (2008), there are five general 
components of the United States BITs and subsequent 
provisions in the United States FTAs:
  1.  Minimum Standard of Treatment that an 
investor should enjoy, including national treat-
ment and most-favoured nation status in both 
the pre-establishment and post-establishment 
rights. On an absolute level, the United States 
investors are to receive “fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection in accordance to 
customary international law.
  2.  Restrictions on Expropriation. BITs and FTAs 
strictly forbid the direct or indirect expropriation 
of the United States investments absent prompt 
and full compensation. 
  3.  Free Transfers. The United States nationals 
and firms must be permitted to freely transfer 
payments in and out of a host country “without 
delay”. This will be discussed in detail below.
  4.  No performance requirements. The United 
States BITs forbid nations from imposing per-
formance requirements such as local content 
rules, joint venture and research and develop-
ment requirements, export requirements, rules 
related to personnel decisions and so forth. 
  5.  Investor-state Arbitration. In stark contrast to 
dispute settlement under the WTO and all other 
aspects of FTAs other than investment rules, the 
United States firms have the right to binding 
arbitration of disputes related to violations of 
the agreements. As is the case with most BITs 
across the world, foreign firms do not have to 
file claims through governments but can take 
a claim to an arbitral panel, often the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank for any 
perceived violation of the above principles.
In addition to these core elements, the United 
States treaties often have some so-called “exceptions” 
such as for essential security, matters related to taxa-
tion (where there is another body of the United States 
international law) and others. Finally, post-2004 BITs 
have putative limitations on the ability of host states 
to reduce environment or labour laws to attract for-
eign investment. Before moving forward, it should 
be underscored that these treaties elevate foreign 
investor rights over domestic investors, as they do 
not require the host country’s firms to liberalize their 
investments, nor do they permit host country inves-
tors to use investor-state arbitration (Hagan, 2000). 
Table 5 lists those nations with a BIT or FTA with 
the United States.
B.  Capital controls and the United States 
BITs and FTAs
The free transfer of funds to and from the United 
States is a core principle of the United States BITs and 
FTAs, as well as those of most other capital exporting 
countries. When a host nation violates that principle, 
or if capital transfers violate the other principles, a 
nation could be subject to an investor-state arbitra-
tion claim where they could be sued for damages. 
All of the United States BITs and FTAs therefore 
restrict the ability of host nations to deploy capital 
controls (Anderson, 2009a). Argentina, after its crisis 
in 2001–02, was subject to numerous such claims in 
the hundreds of millions of dollars.
All United States BITs and FTAs require host 
nations to permit free transfers without delay of all 
types of covered investments. Moreover, financial 
services are covered in BITs and comprise a separate 
chapter in FTAs. Analogous to the GATS, if a nation 
commits to liberalizing financial services, the free 
flow of such investment are covered there as well. It 
should be noted however that under the services chap-
ters of FTAs, dispute resolution is state-to-state.
Over the years, the United States treaties have 
listed numerous types of investments covered, such 
as securities, loans, FDI, bonds (both sovereign and 
private) and derivatives. Treaties also make a point to 
say such a list is non-exhaustive. Taken together, the 
transfers provisions, along with the other principles 
of the agreements ensure that an investment can enter 
and leave a nation freely. If such an investment is re-
stricted, a host-nation can be subject to arbitration.
Of all the treaties the United States has signed, 
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balance-of-payments exception found in NAFTA. 
Article 2014(1) can be invoked when the host state 
“experience serious balance-of-payments difficul-
ties, or the threat thereof”. Like similar exceptions 
at the WTO and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), use of the 
exception must be temporary, non discriminatory and 
consistent with the IMF Articles of Agreement; thus, 
capital controls can only be aimed at capital account 
transactions unless approved by the IMF. 
C.  “Cooling off” provisions
As discussed earlier, Chile is a nation that has 
deployed capital controls to some success. The Unit-
ed States negotiated FTAs with Chile and Singapore 
(who had also used capital controls in the wake of the 
1997 Asian crisis) at the turn of the century, both went 
into force in 2004. The limits in the United States 
model on capital controls became major sticking 
points for both Chile and Singapore. In fact, dur-
ing the negotiations with Chile, USTR head Robert 
Zoellick had to intervene with the Finance Minister 
of Chile to salvage the negotiations over this issue. 
During those negotiations, the United States negoti-
ated a “compromise” that, with some variation, has 
been used in agreements with Singapore, Peru and 
Colombia. Interestingly however, it has not become a 
matter of practice. Such a cooling off period was not 
included in the 2004 Model BIT nor the FTAs with 
the Dominican Republic-Central America-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), Panama 
and others.
The compromise has since become known as 
the “cooling off” provision whereby the United States 
cannot file a claim as in violation of the investment 
provisions until a period of one-year after the pro-
vision has been deployed. The cooling off periods 
are illustrated in an Annex to the agreements. The 
rationale would be that the host nation may need to 
address or stem a financial crisis and that the nation 
should not be subject to claims in the middle of such 
action. However, and this is important, the cool off 
period allows a foreign investor to sue for damages 
related to capital controls that were deployed dur-
ing the cool off year, but cannot file the claim until 
after that year. To be clear, an investor has to wait 
one year to file a claim related to capital controls 
to prevent and mitigate crises, but that claim can 
be for a measure taken during the cooling off year 
(Hornbeck, 2003).
It should also be noted that these provisions are 
not mutual. The cooling off period is only for investors 
suing “a Party other than the United States”. Finally, 
the Annexes agree that once the claim is brought, only 
“actual reduction of the value of the transfer” counts 
as a loss. Loss of profits, loss of business and other 
similar consequential or incidental damages cannot 
be recovered. All of these agreements include some 
exceptions to the Annex, instances where the cool-
ing off period and limitation on damages does not 
apply: payments on current transactions, on transfers 
associated with equity investments, and loan or bond 
payments.
The cooling off language triggered controversy 
in the United States, leading to hearings specifically 
on the subject on 1 April 2003 at the Subcommittee 
on Domestic and International Monetary, Trade and 
Technology of the Committee on Financial Services 
in the United States House of Representatives (US 
House of Representatives, 2003). The committee was 
chaired by Congressman Michael Oxley (R-Indiana, 
majority), with the minority head being Barney 
Frank (D-Massachusetts, minority). In general, the 
lively hearings revealed that most Republicans were 
against the use of capital controls, whereas Demo-
crats favoured more flexibility. The hearings were 
very lively. 
The leading advocate for restricting capital 
controls was John Taylor, then Under-Secretary of 
the United States Treasury for International Affairs 
in the Bush Administration. As a Stanford University 
economist he had become famous for the “Taylor 
Rule” that sets a formula for inflation targeting. 
Insiders thus began referring to the cooling off pro-
visions as the “Taylor Provisions”. Interestingly, the 
hearings included harsh rebuttals to Taylor by Nancy 
Birdsall of the Center for Global Development, Jag-
dish Bhagwati of Colombia University and Daniel 
Tarullo, then of Georgetown University and now on 
the Board of Governors of the United States Federal 
Reserve System. These individuals are staunch sup-
porters of free trade in goods, but argued that capital 
account liberalization without exception is danger-
ous from economic and foreign policy perspectives. 
Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney (D-New York, 
now chair of Joint Economic Committee) argued in 
favour of flexibility. At the hearings, Barney Frank 
famously remarked that “ice is in the eyes of the 
beholder”, arguing that the cooling off period still 
effectively restricts Chile and Singapore from using 
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Around the same time, senior IMF officials 
in the legal department wrote articles arguing that 
BITs should have at least temporary derogations for 
balance-of-payments difficulties and that the cooling 
off period was not sufficient. Hagan (2000) expresses 
concern that if one nation forbids a host country 
from using capital controls on a temporary basis, but 
the host country is permitted to use controls under 
agreements with other nations, then the controls will 
be discriminatory in nature and lead to distortions. 
Siegel (2004) who called the cooling off provisions 
“draconian”, expressed concern that the United States 
transfers provisions raised jurisdictional issues with 
the IMF. The United States provisions call for free 
transfers of all current transactions, but unlike WTO, 
OECD and other capital exporters, the United States 
provisions do not include mention of the ability of 
the IMF to recommend capital controls as part of a 
financial programme. Siegel argues that FTAs “create 
a risk that in complying with its obligations under the 
FTA, a member could be rendered ineligible to use the 
Fund’s resources under the Fund’s articles” (Siegel, 
2004: 4). Finally, in meetings with IMF officials, 
concern was expressed over the lack of consistency 
between the United States agreements and others. For 
instance, the Republic of Korea has a broad exception 
under the OECD codes and its other BITs, but not 
with the United States. Which measure holds?
D.  Illustrative discussion of capital controls 
and violations of the United States 
investment rules
It should be clear from the above discussion that 
capital controls are in fundamental violation of the 
core principle in the United States trade and invest-
ment treaties that requires the free transfer of funds 
without delay. That said, it is important to understand 
exactly how these provisions work in relation to vari-
ous types of controls. Such an exercise reveals that 
it is possible that some kinds of capital controls may 
be able to slip through the United States investment 
rules. However, given that there are no derogations 
in the United States treaties, such possibilities are far 
from certain. Some of the avenues in which capital 
controls could be actionable under the United States 
BITs and FTAs are exhibited in table 6.
Capital inflow restrictions such as URRs, mini-
mum stay requirements, outright prohibitions on 
certain types of inflows are designed to keep out or 
slow the flow of short-term inflows into an economy. 
On the surface, restrictions on inflows may escape 
violation because an investor has to show that the 
investor has been “damaged” or that the value of 
an investment has been diminished in order to file a 
claim. Instruments to prevent an investment before 
Table 6
POSSIBlE cONFlIcTS BETWEEN cAPITAl cONTROlS  
AND ThE UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS
Capital control Potential conflict
Restrictions on currency mismatches Absolute violation of transfers and services provisions, dimishes value 
of investment 
Unremunerated reserve requirements Absolute violation of transfers provisions, diminishes value of 
investment and analogous to an expropriation if an investor wanted to 
retrieve its funds during the “minimum stay” portion of the URR
Taxes on inflows Relative violation of pre-establishment national treatment, diminishes 
value of investment, could be seen as expropriation
Minimum stay requirements Absolute violation of transfers provisions analogous to an expropriation 
if an investor wanted to retrieve its funds during the “minimum stay”
Taxes/restrictions on outflows Absolute violation of transfers and services provisions, possible 
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it occurs therefore may have more “cover” under 
the agreements. However, restrictions on inflows 
violate the ability of investors to have market access 
and national treatment pre-establishment. A claim 
could arise simply on those grounds or because an 
investor who may have made previous investments 
in a host country and is suddenly not permitted to do 
so because of a capital control, could claim that the 
investor no longer enjoys fair and equitable treat-
ment and the minimum standard of treatment under 
the agreement. What’s more, if an investor wanted 
to pull funds from a country that were held by a 
URR or minimum stay requirement (as a form of 
outflow then), the capital control would restrict the 
free transfer out of the country and clearly be subject 
to a claim – as would almost all the other outflows 
measures listed in table 2. Indeed, not only do restric-
tions on outflows violate transfers provisions, but 
they can also be seen as expropriations. Moreover, 
if a nation has committed to liberalizing financial 
services under the services chapter of an FTA, all 
inflows and outflows that pertain to the (negatively) 
listed service cannot be restricted.
One other possible avenue for policy space 
may be available for limits by domestic firms or 
domestic residents in borrowing or lending abroad. 
Remember that investment rules do not cover do-
mestic investors, nor are domestic investors able 
to resort to investor-state dispute settlement. On 
the surface, such a provision would not be subject 
to a claim as a violation of the transfers provisions 
because such restrictions to not consider a covered 
investment. However, it may be possible that a claim 
could arise by an investor arguing that national treat-
ment principles had been violated. By restricting 
the United States banks from lending in dollars, it 
could possibly be claimed that a nation is treating 
its domestic currency more favourably. An investor 
may attempt to claim that a measure of this kind is in 
violation of fair and equitable treatment for reasons 
discussed above.
One window that would appear to be available 
to nations is the ability to tax capital inflows and 
outflows. Brazil taxed inflows of capital in late 2009, 
Malaysia taxed outflows in 1998–99. All United 
States treaties have a chapter or series of paragraphs 
discussing taxation, saying that “nothing in Section 
A shall impose obligations with respect to taxation 
measures”. Yet, it distinguishes between traditional 
taxation and taxation that may be expropriating. 
Thus, the evidence is not clear cut. In one of the 
numerous cases against Argentina in the aftermath 
of its 2000–01 crisis, an ICSID tribunal ruled that a 
tax on outflows was tantamount to an expropriation 
(Salacuse, 2010).
It may be possible that a nation can claim that 
actions taken during a financial crisis are measures 
needed to protect the essential security of the nation. 
Language like Article 18 of the United States Model 
BIT is found in most treaties:
... to preclude a Party from applying measures 
that it considers necessary for the fulfilment of 
its obligations with respect to the maintenance 
or restoration of international peace or security, 
or the protection of its own essential security 
interests (USTR, 2004).
The article does not mention economic crises 
per se, but “all tribunals that have considered the 
matter thus far have interpreted the rules broadly 
enough to include such crises” (Salacuse, 2010: 345). 
However, tribunals differ greatly over how grave the 
difficulties may be. In Argentina again, only one of 
three tribunals ruled that Argentina could not be held 
liable for actions it took to halt its crisis (Salacuse, 
2010). A key matter is whether or not a measure by a 
nation to stem a crisis can be seen as “self-judging”. 
In other words, can the nation deploying the control 
be the judge of whether or not the measure taken was 
necessary to protect its security. The language quoted 
above in the 2004 Model BIT, which says “that it 
considers” is now seen as to mean that a measure is 
self judging (because of the “it”), but Argentina’s 
BITs with the United States and others did not include 
as precise language at the time.
Finally, Article 20.1 of the 2004 Model BIT 
includes a provision on prudential measures that has 
almost the exact language found in the GATS under 
domestic regulations. It reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
Treaty, a Party shall not be prevented from 
adopting or maintaining measures relating to fi-
nancial services for prudential reasons, includ-
ing for the protection of investors, depositors, 
policy holders, or persons to whom a fiduciary 
duty is owed by a financial services supplier, 
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. Where such measures do not 
conform with the provisions of this Treaty, they 
shall not be used as a means of avoiding the 
Party’s commitments or obligations under this 
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This language is only to be found in the United 
States-Rwanda BIT that is yet to be ratified and not 
found in the United States FTAs. Regarding capital 
controls, the United States Government has stated 
that it is not its intention that controls be covered 
under this provision (US Department of State Advi-
sory Committee on International Economic Policy, 
2009). As discussed earlier, some have expressed 
concern that the last sentence of this paragraph may 
be self-cancelling, others see it as quite flexible (Key, 
2003; Raghavan, 2009; Stumberg, 2009; Tucker and 
Wallach, 2009; Van Aaken and Kurtz, 2009).
v.  The United States investment 
provisions versus others by major 
capital exporters
The investment provisions in the United States 
FTAs and of the United States BITs stand in stark 
contrast to the treaties of other major capital export-
ing nations. This section of the paper reviews the 
measures in the OECD codes of liberalization and 
some specific treaties by the EU, Canada, Japan and 
China. 
A.  OECD codes
In many respects, the OECD has the most ex-
pansive investment rules, as they cover all types of 
capital flows, whether they are from the current or 
capital account. However, the OECD also has the 
broadest level of temporary derogations. Similar 
scope and derogation can be found in the OECD-
sponsored Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI), which was never agreed upon. In terms of 
policy space for capital controls under the OECD 
Codes and the MAI:
Members (OECD members) are expected to  • 
liberalize both the current and capital account.
Members have a broad, but temporary deroga- • 
tion where capital controls on both inflows and 
outflows are permitted.
The OECD’s draft MAI included a broad dero- • 
gation analogous to that of the Codes.
Incorporated in the early 1960s, two legally 
binding “Codes” govern capital flows in OECD 
countries, the Code of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements and the Code of Liberalization of Cur-
rent Invisible Operations – usually referred to as the 
Capital Movements Code and the Current Invisible 
Code. These codes cover all types of investments – 
inflows and outflows from the current and capital 
account – and require their liberalization. 
Initially, speculative capital was excluded from 
the Codes on grounds that short-term capital would 
disrupt the balance-of-payments position of OECD 
members and make it difficult for nations to pursue 
independent monetary and exchange rate policies. 
This was changed in 1989 when a group of nations 
led by the United Kingdom and Germany who argued 
that all OECD nations by then had sophisticated 
enough money markets that they could withstand 
liberalization of short-term flows. All nations that 
acceded to the OECD since 1989, regardless of their 
level of development, also liberalized their capital ac-
counts fully to include short and long-term maturities. 
The Republic of Korea, however, in its accession, 
argued that it should have a grace period to gradually 
open their capital account as they developed. The 
OECD denied this request, conditioning membership 
on an open capital account. In the end, the Republic 
of Korea conceded (Abdelal, 2007).
Alongside the broad mandates for OECD 
countries there are also broad exceptions. Article 7 
(in each set of Codes) holds the “clauses of dero-
gation” that govern the temporary suspension of 
commitments. Under these safeguards, a nation may 
suspend liberalization. Article 7b allows a member 
to put in place temporary capital controls to stem 
what may “result in serious economic disturbance 
in the Member State concerned, that Member may 
withdraw those measures”. Article 7c is the balance-
of-payments exception “If the overall balance of 
payments of a Member develops adversely at a 
rate and in circumstances, including the state of its 
monetary reserves, which it considers serious that 
Member may temporarily suspend the application 
of measures of liberalisation taken” (OECD, 2009). 
Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey have all 
used the derogation. The OECD permitted them to do 
so because these nations were seen to be at a lower 
stage of development relative to the other members 
of the OECD (Abdelal, 2007).
The OECD sponsored Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment was launched in 1995 as an attempt at 
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the Codes – for OECD and non-OECD (developing) 
countries alike. The draft text of that treaty included a 
broad safeguard for capital controls and other meas-
ures for balance-of-payments problem. In the end, the 
MAI was abandoned in 1998 (OECD, 1998).
B.  BITs and FTAs for other major capital 
exporters
The EU, Japan, Canada and increasingly China 
are major capital exporters. Each of these capital 
exporters has numerous BITs and FTAs with nations 
across the world. And loosely, the BITs of these na-
tions have the same general characteristics found in 
the United States BITs. However, in the case of the 
use of capital controls to prevent and mitigate finan-
cial crises, the BITs and investment provisions of all 
BITs and FTAs by these exporters either contain a 
broad “balance-of-payments” temporary safeguard 
exception, or a “controlled entry” exception that al-
lows a nation to deploy its domestic laws pertaining 
to capital controls.
Examples of the balance-of-payments approach 
can be found in the EU-South Africa and Mexico 
FTAs (remember Mexico negotiated such a provision 
in NAFTA), the Japan-Republic of Korea BIT and the 
ASEAN agreements. The Republic of Korea-Japan 
BIT has language that clearly allows for restrictions 
on both inflows and outflows, presumably inspired 
by the 1997–98 crisis. The BIT states that nations 
may violate transfers provisions.
(a)  in the event of serious balance-of-payments and 
external financial difficulties or threat thereof; or
(b)  in cases where, in exceptional circumstances, 
movements of capital cause or threaten to cause 
serious difficulties for macroeconomic manage-
ment, in particular, monetary or exchange rate 
policies (quoted from Salucuse, 2010: 268).
Another way capital controls are treated by 
capital exporters in FTAs and BITs is referred to as 
“controlled entry” whereby a nation’s domestic laws 
regarding capital controls are deferred to. Canada and 
the EU’s FTAs with Chile and Colombia each have 
a balance-of-payments safeguard and a controlled 
entry deferment (Canada Foreign Affairs and Inter-
national Trade, 2009). As an example of controlled 
entry, the investment chapter of the FTA between 
Canada and Colombia has an Annex which states 
“Colombia reserves the right to maintain or adopt 
measures to maintain or preserve the stability of its 
currency, in accordance with Colombian domestic 
legislation”.
Controlled entry provisions are to be found 
in BITs as well. The EU does not sign many BITs 
as a union, but individual countries do. The China-
Germany BIT states that transfers must comply 
with China’s laws on exchange controls (Anderson, 
2009b). In the case of China, that nation has to ap-
prove all foreign inflows and outflows of short-term 
capital (IMF, 2009).
Interestingly, EU member BITs vary a great 
deal. Some, like the China-Germany BIT and the 
United Kingdom-Bangladesh BIT, allow for a nation 
to defer to its own laws governing capital controls. On 
the other hand, Sweden and Austria had the United 
States-style BITs with no exceptions whatsoever. 
However, the European Court of Justice ruled in 
2009 that Sweden’s and Austria’s BITs with several 
developing countries were in violation of their ob-
ligations under the EU treaty. While the EU treaty 
requires EU members to allow for free transfers, it 
also allows members to have exceptions. The court 
found that Sweden’s and Austria’s treaties were in-
compatible with the EU treaty and that such treaties 
would need to be renegotiated to include exceptions 
to the transfers provisions (Salacuse, 2010).
Echoing concerns expressed by the IMF ear-
lier in the paper, host countries facing a diversity of 
commitments through different treaties can cause 
jurisdictional issues and cause economic distortions. 
The pending United States-Republic of Korea Free 
Trade Agreement is illustrative of the jurisdictional 
issue. If the Republic of Korea decided it needed to 
deploy controls on inflows as a prudential measure 
to prevent a crisis, they may have all the leeway to 
do so under the exceptions to the OECD codes, but 
not under the FTA with the United States. A conflict 
over which regime should prevail could arise. This 
could be further accentuated if the IMF was asked 
to conduct a country programme for the Republic 
of Korea and advised the nation to deploy capital 
controls.
The United States FTAs with Chile and Co-
lombia just discussed are examples of potential 
discrimination problems. If Chile or Colombia 
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short-term capital inflows, the countries’ treaty com-
mitments would not permit the measures to be truly 
non-discriminatory. Chile or Colombia would only 
be able to apply the measure to the EU or to Canadian 
firms and capital, not to capital flowing from the 
United States, thereby distorting capital markets 
and defeating the purpose of the non-discriminatory 
prudential measure.
Returning to some of the key questions outlined 
above, the following can be said about the BITs and 
FTAs in relation to capital controls. The United States 
holds 58 signed or pending BITs and FTAs with other 
countries. Almost all capital controls are actionable 
under these treaties. Recourse can be in the form of 
a one-time compensatory pay-off.
vI. Summary and recommendations for 
policy
This paper has shown that the United States 
trade and investment agreements, and to some extent 
the WTO, leave little room for deploying capital con-
trols to prevent and mitigate a financial crisis. This 
is the case despite the increasing economic evidence 
showing that certain capital controls can be useful in 
preventing or mitigating financial crises. It also stands 
in contrast with investment rules under the treaties 
of most capital exporting nations.
That being said, there is room for developing 
countries to deploy capital controls to prevent and 
mitigate financial crises under the following cir-
cumstances:
The controls are on capital account transac- • 
tions, not current account transactions, unless 
sanctioned by the IMF;
the nation has not committed financial services  • 
under the GATS at the WTO;
the nation does not have a BIT or FTA with the  • 
United States.
Many nations fall under this category of course, 
including China, Brazil, India and others who fre-
quently deploy capital controls, either on a permanent 
or temporary basis to ensure macroeconomic stabil-
ity. A more plausible option is reforming current 
and future agreements. Especially in the wake of the 
global financial crisis, nations should coordinate their 
policies so as to avoid discrimination and jurisdic-
tional inconsistency. 
In terms of the WTO, close to 100 nations have 
not made financial services commitments under the 
GATS and are therefore free to deploy whichever 
type of capital control on capital account transactions 
they see necessary. However, the 37 economies listed 
in table 4 have made significant commitments on 
either Modes 1 or 3 for financial services and could 
be significantly vulnerable to actions against the use 
of capital controls. 
Those nations that still retain the policy space 
to deploy capital controls and have not reached the 
threshold (identified by Kose et al., discussed earlier) 
necessary to withstand capital account liberalization 
should pursue Mode 1 (cross border trade in financial 
services) commitments with caution in the Doha 
Round. As this paper has shown, such commitments 
implicitly require an opening of the capital account. 
Moreover, those nations should exercise even more 
caution in terms of Mode 3 (FDI in financial services) 
commitments. The IMF study discussed in this paper 
shows that those developing countries that liberal-
ized FDI in financial services fared worse during the 
current crisis (Ostry et al., 2010). Regarding those 
nations that have already made commitments with 
respect to financial services under the GATS (the 
nations in table 4), their only recourse will be the 
untested exceptions for prudential regulation and 
balance-of-payments exceptions. 
Based on the analyses in this paper, there are five 
non-exclusive examples that the United States could 
consider that would give countries more policy space 
for capital controls that would make its BITs and 
FTAs more conducive to the use of capital controls 
and more consistent with most international trade 
and investment agreements:
Remove short-term debt obligations and port- • 
folio investments from the list of investments 
covered in treaties. This has been raised as a 
possibility by parties ranging from the IMF to 
civil society (Hagan, 2000; IISD, 2005).
Create “controlled entry” Annexes in BITs and  • 
FTAs analogous to the Canada-Chile, Canada-
Colombia, China and EU agreements with those 
nations. Controlled entry grants a nation the full 
ability to use capital controls on capital account 
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Design a balance-of-payments exception that  • 
covers both inflows and outflows such as the 
provisions found in the Japan-Republic of 
Korea BIT.
Clarify that the Essential Security exceptions  • 
cover financial crises and that measures taken 
by host nations are self-judging.
Resort to a state-to-state dispute resolution  • 
process for claims related to financial crises, 
analogous to the WTO and the other chapters 
in most FTAs.
The last recommendation is an important one. 
Under a state-to-state dispute resolution system, the 
state can take a much broader view regarding finan-
cial stability than an individual firm can. Whereas 
individual speculative firms may stand to lose from 
a capital control in the short term (unless their cli-
ents default, of course), the net welfare benefits of a 
measure may be positive. The state is seen as being 
in a better position to “screen” for such benefits and 
also to weigh a dispute case against a variety of other 
geopolitical and economic considerations it may have 
with a host nation. Given that BITs and FTAs current 
lack a state-to-state dispute system with appropriate 
screening mechanisms, these are likely to be used 
most by the private sector to file claims in response 
to measures taken to mitigate the global financial 
crisis (Van Aaken and Kurtz, 2009).
Leading political scientists have been puzzled 
as to why the United States continues its policy of 
capital account liberalization given the economic 
evidence, the treaties of its peers and the literature ar-
guing that governments should favour capital controls 
(Alfaro, 2004). Cohen (2007) attributes the United 
States stance as due to a combination of ideology and 
domestic politics. Regardless of the party in power 
in the United States, Treasury officials and Presiden-
tial advisors have largely favoured capital account 
liberalization despite strong evidence and theory to 
the contrary. Perhaps more importantly, Cohen notes 
that while the costs of capital controls are directly felt 
by a handful of politically organized United States 
constituents – Wall Street – the beneficiaries are dif-
fuse and do not feel the direct effects. 
The arguments posed by the community lob-
bying against flexibilities for capital controls in the 
United States are threefold. First, it is argued that 
capital controls simply do not work and that the Unit-
ed States treaties help nations get rid of sub-optimal 
policy. Second, such controls hurt the United States 
investors by restricting their ability to mobilize funds. 
Third, changing the United States treaties would 
send a signal that earlier treaties are problematic and 
jeopardize commitments previously taken.
The evidence and politics may be changing. 
As discussed earlier, the evidence in favour of many 
capital controls is positive. Secondly, the current cri-
sis has made it clear that while it is recognized that 
some individuals may incur costs or damage in the 
short-term, these may be minimal relative to what 
they could be under a crisis. Stability among our 
investment partners helps the United States investors 
and exporters have more certainty for markets. Cri-
ses could lead to defaults and large losses to United 
States assets and export markets. And, crises can 
cause contagion that spreads to other United States 
investment and export destinations. Third, the United 
States may now be more sensitive, given that it has 
taken numerous prudential measures in the wake of 
the current crisis –measures that may not survive the 
scrutiny of various trade and investment treaties with 
capital exporters who have investments in the United 
States (Van Aaken and Kurtz, 2009).
In 2009, the United States Department of State’s 
Advisory Committee on International Economic 
Policy assembled a subcommittee to review the 2004 
Model BIT. Some on that subcommittee recom-
mended that the administration review the provisions 
on transfers and consider including temporary dero-
gations (USDOS, 2009). Furthermore, members of 
the Democratic Party who favoured flexibilities for 
controls in 2003 are now in the majority, and the 
United States-Colombia FTA is pending in Con-
gress. Albeit unsuccessfully, Congressman Michael 
Michaud (D-Maine) introduced a provision to the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2009 that would have ensured that trade agreements 
preserve “the ability of each country that is a party to 
such an agreement to regulate foreign investment in 
a manner consistent with the needs and priorities of 
each such country”, and that “allows each party that 
is a party to such trade agreement to place prudential 
restrictions on speculative capital to reduce global 
financial instability and trade volatility” (Michaud, 
2009). There is similar language in a pending bill in 
the United States Congress entitled the Trade Re-
form, Accountability, Development and Employment 
(TRADE) Act. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if 
the current crisis is a wake-up call for more prudent 
trade and investment policy.19 Policy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment Agreements
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